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This thesis presents an analysis of the Army Acquisition
Corps. The Packard Commission and the Army's Materiel
Acquisition Management program are used to develop issues and
questions concerning the selection, education, training, and
assignment policies for Army Acquisition Corps officers. A
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conducted with fourteen Army program managers using the issues
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analyzed and conclusions are made on the structure and
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The United States Army established the Army Acquisition
Corps (AAC) in 1989. This was done in response to
congressional legislation, several General Accounting Office
(GAO) reports, studies by groups outside the U.S. Government,
and also a sense within the Army hierarchy itself that the
Army's program for developing those personnel that would be
entrusted with the responsibility for acquisition of equipment
was not as formal or structured as it should be. The Army
Acquisition Corps is the latest in the evolution of programs
the Army has utilized to select, educate, train, and assign
those personnel who are responsible for the procurement of the
equipment the Army requires to perform its mission.
The arrival of the Reagan administration brought with it
the support for the largest peacetime buildup of military
forces in the history of the United States. This massive
effort involved the purchase of millions of dollars worth of
military hardware to allow the United States to strengthen its
position as a world military power. The financial support for
this endeavor had to come from the U.S. Government through the
congressional authorization and appropriations process. In
the early 1980s it appeared as though any military equipment
that was requested was approved by the "purse-holders" in
Congress, but as the decade wore on two factors turned the
atmosphere of a "blank check" for military spending to one of
a more cautious "do we really need this" attitude.
The first involves the now infamous stories of outrageous
prices paid for military equipment such as coffee-makers,
toilet seats, and hammers and the media attention that these
incidents generated. This caused the American public to start
questioning how well the acquisition of materiel was being
accomplished and more importantly, how qualified those
responsible for this action actually were.
The second major factor was the political upheaval of the
late 1980s that resulted in the collapse of the Warsaw Pact as
a military alliance and with it the reduction in the perceived
need for a major military role for United States forces in
Europe
.
These two factors have combined for a new and more
heightened attention on the U.S. military establishment's role
in the world. This has already led to the plans for a major
reduction in military spending.
In light of the fact that the United States Army will
still have a mission to be performed, the money it receives to
accomplish this mission will have to be spent in an
environment of shrinking defense budgets and continued public
scrutiny on how well it is spent. The members of the Army
Acquisition Corps will have the largest and most visible role
in seeing that the money provided is spent wisely, and public
perception and opinion of how well this is done will be a
testament of the success of the Army Acquisition Corps.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis has two main objectives. They are as follows:
1. Determine what major problems have already been
identified with current and past acquisition personnel
qualifications, training, and career paths. A survey of
previously conducted studies and reports will be
utilized.
2. Analyze the current Army Acquisition Corps actions for
solving these issues in order to develop a stronger Army
acquisition work force. Research methodology included
questionnaires and personal interviews with currently
serving Army program managers.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Questions
a. How well does the Army Acquisition Corps address the
issues that Army officers have historically had while
serving as program managers?
b. What education, training, and experience provide the





a. What programs were used to train program managers
prior to the establishment of the Army Acquisition
Corps?
b. What were the significant studies, reports, and
legislation that led to the establishment of the Army
Acquisition Corps and what problems did these documents
uncover?
c. What is the Army Acquisition Corps - How are Army
officers selected, educated, trained, and assigned and
what are the selection and assignment policies for the
career path of the Army Acquisition Corps officer?
d. What do Army program managers who are currently serving
in field artillery type programs believe were the
critical aspects that prepared them for their positions?
e. What is effective in the current career model for the
Army Acquisition Corps officer and what improvements can
be incorporated into the model?
D. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis is restricted to Army officers
serving as program managers. This is an important restriction
as each branch of the military is involved in acquisition and
each has branch specific policies and procedures. All the
military branches must deal with the same laws and Department
of Defense regulations yet each has a different way of
structuring, organizing, and implementing their programs to
accomplish training of their acquisition personnel.
The Army Acquisition Corps is the Army's unique program
for the selection and training of its own procurement
personnel. The scope of this thesis is further restricted to
the military personnel side of the AAC. This is an important
distinction since the AAC actually is composed of both
civilians and military personnel.
E. LIMITATIONS
Due to time and fiscal constraints, the sample size
considered only program managers in field artillery type
programs. Therefore the sample size was limited to fourteen
program manager positions.
Since the sample size was small, the researcher
administered the questionnaire through personal interviews
with individuals serving in the selected programs. This
method provided insurance that the desired individual was in
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fact the appropriate respondent and also allowed the
interviewees to go into more specific detail in their answers
to the questions posed. During the research segment two of
the original program managers that were selected had to be
dropped due to unforeseen scheduling problems that conflicted
with the originally agreed to schedule.
F. LITERATURE REVIEW
Preliminary research for this thesis included a thorough
examination of the literature base through the Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and course
material from MN3301, Systems Acquisition and Program
Management, taught at the Naval Postgraduate School. The
proponent office of the Army Acquisition Corps, located at
Army Materiel Command headquarters, also provided written
reference material and information on the program offices
themselves.
6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in developing this thesis was as
follows:
1. The research question was chosen.
2. An initial literature review was conducted using course
materials, and information provided by the DLSIE search
along with information provided by the AAC proponent
office. This step involved correlating the issues and
problems that previous studies had found with Army
procurement personnel
.
3. The questionnaire used to standardize the information
provided by program managers- was developed.
4. The method of data collection using personal interviews
was decided upon along with the selection of the program
managers to be interviewed.
5. The program offices selected for the thesis were
contacted telephonically and interviews were scheduled
with each of the program managers.
6. The researcher traveled to the selected program offices
and the interviews were conducted. All the interviews
were conducted using a common questionnaire and were
recorded on audio tape for further analysis.
7. Interview materials were reviewed and analyzed and the
thesis report was drafted.
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter I introduced the reader to the purpose and
methodology of this thesis, along with the research questions
to be answered.
Chapter II will describe the problems that various studies
have found in the career development of Army officers in the
acquisition field. A brief description of the Material
Acquisition Management (MAM) program is also included.
Chapter III Will give a detailed description of the Army
Acquisition Corps (AAC) . The implementation plan will be
described along with a complete explanation of the career
development model.
Chapter IV will present and analyze the information
collected through the researcher's personal interviews.
Fourteen Army officers were interviewed and their responses to
a standard script of questions provided the primary research
material for this thesis.
Chapter V is a compilation of the researcher's conclusions
and recommendations to improve the Army Acquisition Corps.
I . TERMINOLOGY
Many military acronyms are used throughout this thesis.
Those that are not commonly known are explained.
Additionally, the term "program manager" is used liberally in
this thesis. Army officers performing management functions in
acquisition have different titles. "Product Manager" is the
title for a management position that requires a Lieutenant
Colonel by personnel authorization documents. "Project
Manager" is the title for a position that requires a Colonel.
Unless specifically stated otherwise, the term "Program
Manager" is used to refer to either case above. The term
"program management" is used in the same sense, and refers to
the management of any product, project, or program regardless
of the rank authorization.
II . BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the background of the Army
Acquisition Corps (AAC) through a review of the major findings
of studies and commissions on the problems found in the Army's
programs and policies regarding its military acquisition
workforce. A brief description of the Army's Material
Acquisition Management (MAM) program the immediate predecessor
to the AAC, will follow as a baseline reference for
explanations and evaluations of the AAC.
B. THE PACKARD COMMISSION
A major defense management study in recent years, is
commonly referred to as the Packard Commission Report, Was the
report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, "A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the
President". [Ref. 1] The Commission was headed by David
Packard, a widely known and respected businessman, who had
served as Deputy Defense Secretary during the Nixon and Ford
administrations (1968-1976) . Packard became familiar with the
career paths of military officers during his tenure in the
Department of Defense (DoD) . He recognized the clear path to
success for operational commanders and the lack of such a path
for military officers working in the procurement field. In
November 1983, Packard expressed his concern on this matter to
the Senate Armed Services Committee some three years before
his Commission would release their results:
I believe that each service should be restructured to have
two clearly defined and separate career paths for the
development of officers. One should be to train men and
women as commanders of military forces. The other would be
to train men and women as managers in procurement. [Ref.
2:p. 192]
Mr. Packard and the members of his committee were tasked
by President Reagan to conduct a study of defense management
and organization and to report their findings and
recommendations
.
The study took a year and, although not specifically
designed to investigate military procurement, made findings
and recommendations targeted at the way materiel acquisition
was performed. The final report was presented to the
President on June 30, 1986. The Packard Commission supported
a number of reforms in defense management grouped into the
following categories:
1) National Security Planning and Budgeting
2) Military Organization and Command
3) Acquisition Organization and Procedures
4) Government-Industry Accountability
Each of these categories was the title of a chapter in the
final report [Ref. l:p. vii] . The third chapter of the report
was specifically targeted at issues in defense acquisition and
cited a number of areas in need of reform and suggestions for
their improvement.
Major issues in personnel management were identified and
the Commission recommended that DoD take action on their
findings. The Commission's method of study was described as
follows:
We compared the defense acquisition system with other
systems, both government and commercial, that develop and
produce equipment of comparable complexity, in order to find
success stories that could provide a model on which reforms
of the defense acquisition system could be based. Defense
acquisition represents the largest and, in our judgment the
most important business enterprise in the world. It deserves
to be managed with the highest standards. We therefore
conducted a "search for excellence" by examining
organizations that had been most successful in acquisition,
in order to find a model of excellence for defense
acquisition. [Ref. l:p. 41]
The difficult job of a program manager was clearly
recognized by the Packard Commission in its final report when
it stated:
The program manager finds that, far from being the manager
of the program, he is merely one of the participants who
can influence it. An army of advocates for special
interests descends on the program to ensure that it
complies with various standards for military
specifications, reliability, maintainability, operability,
small and minority business utilization, and competition
to name a few. Each of these advocates can demand that
the program manager take or refrain from some action, but
none of them has any responsibility for the ultimate cost,
schedule, or performance of the program. [Ref. l:p. 46]
In researching a successful model to emulate, the Packard
Commission compared the Defense Department policies and
procedures to those of other large institutions that had
managed programs of similar complexity. Private industrial
firms such as IBM, Boeing, and AT&T were examined to try to
identify a common set of successful principles. In the final
report, four underlying features were identified as being
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implementable in the Defense Department's acquisition
workforce:
1) Clear command channels.
2) Stability.
3) Small, high-quality staffs.
4) Communications with users. [Ref. l:p. 50]
The AAC has, in ways to be described in Chapter III,
incorporated the four features the Packard Commission
described above by establishing clear command channels,
enhancing stability through revised tenure rules for program
managers, taking action to produce small, high-quality staffs,
and allowing for communications with users to be facilitated.
The Packard Commission's section that deals with improving
the quality of acquisition personnel opens with the following:
DoD must be able to attract and retain the caliber of
people necessary for a quality acquisition program.
Significant improvements should be made in the senior-
level appointment system. The Secretary of Defense should
have increased authority to establish flexible personnel
management policies necessary to improve defense
acquisition. An alternate personnel management system
should be established to include senior acquisition
personnel and contracting officers as well as scientists
and engineers. [Ref. l:pp. 65-66]
The Packard Commission further states:
Our study convinces us that lasting progress in
performance of the acquisition system demands dramatic
improvements in our management of acquisition personnel at
all levels within DoD. [Ref. l:p. 66]
The Packard Commission also targets the lower levels of the
acquisition workforce by saying:
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Comparable improvements also are required for effective
middle management and better line personnel. The defense
acquisition workforce mingles civilian and military
expertise in numerous disciplines for management and
staffing of the world's largest procurement organization.
Each year billions of dollars are spent more or less
efficiently, based on the competence and experience of
these personnel. Yet, compared to its industry
counterparts, this workforce is undertrained, underpaid,
and inexperienced. Whatever other changes may be made, it
is vitally important to enhance the quality of the defense
acquisition workforce—both by attracting qualified new
personnel and by improving the training and motivation of
current personnel. [Ref. l:pp. 66-67]
It is clear that although the Packard Commission dealt
with a wide range of problems in defense management, they
specifically mentioned a need for quick reform to improve the
quality of the acquisition workforce. The Army Acquisition
Corps was developed and established to achieve this end.
The Packard Commission's findings were not a complete
surprise to the Army. Prior to the release of the
Commission's report there was evidence within the Army to
suggest that dissatisfaction existed over the lack of success
in training program managers. General Henry A. Miley, USA
(ret.), commented in 1984 that:
...the Army is not completely satisfied that the project
managers which OPMS [Officer Personnel Management System]
(and its predecessor system) has produced over the last
twenty or so years have uniformly achieved the same level
of success as its Combat Commander group. The Army's
project managers have been on the "acquisition
battlefield" continuously since 1962. Even though many
weapon systems have been developed and deployed during
that period, the Army's perception is that at least some
of the programs were not as successful as they could have
been. Further, there is a perception that the quality and
performance of the project managers have been contributing
factors. The accepted indicators of the less than
reasonable success of the program have been the highly
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publicized reports of system deficiencies, cost over-runs
and delayed fielding. [Ref. 2:pp. 153-154]
Finally, the Packard Commission's report was not the only
study that found fault with the training of military
acquisition managers. The General Accounting Office (GAO)
reported in 1986 that:
Program management is a position of substantial complexity
and responsibility, involving decisions on weapons systems
sometimes costing billions of dollars, which will
ultimately determine capability on the battlefield. As
such, development of qualified program managers requires
appropriate experience, training, and education, as well
as the ability to attract promising candidates into the
field. DOD policy has, since 1974, recognized this need.
Nevertheless, while some recently appointed program
managers possess substantial experience and training, many
do not. Changes are needed in current service programs to
ensure a highly qualified cadre of program managers. [Ref.
3:p. 68]
The Army * s MAM development program had been in existence
for three years at the time both the Packard Commission and
the GAO presented the studies referred to above. Thus, it was
the MAM development program, that apparently was not
effective.
C. THE MATERIEL ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (MAM) PROGRAM
The Army's program for the development of its future
program managers during the 1980s was called the Material
Acquisition Management (MAM) program. This program was the
immediate predecessor to the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) and
existed from 1983 until it was superseded in 1989 by the
establishment of the AAC. The MAM program itself was a
successor to the Army's Project Manager Development Program
(PMDP) . The PMDP will not be discussed as it is not germane
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to this study other than recognizing it in the evolutionary
chain of programs to develop Army program managers. A more
complete description of the PMDP can be found in Nidel ' s paper
on the evolution of the AAC. [Ref. 4]
The MAM program was based upon three phases. The first
was termed the user/support development phase that entailed
the first six to eight years of an officer's career. This
phase was simply the normal career development pattern used by
any of the basic branches, thus there was nothing different
about this part of a MAM officer's career than any non-MAM
officer. It involved the branch basic and advanced courses
and typical jobs for Lieutenants and Captains in company-level
assignments up to and including company- level command.
The second phase, deemed the MAM development phase, began
upon formal entry into the MAM program which was done by a
selection board. This phase was the first departure from the
common operational career track. It carried the officer from
formal entry until thesixteenth year of service.
The third and final phase was known as the certified
manager phase and commenced with a certification board after
the officer had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
Since the first phase did not depart from the traditional
career pattern, it bears no further explanation.
At the MAM development phase, the Army started the
acquisition development process. The officer, at the point of
entry into the MAM program, held not only a basic branch but
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also had selected an alternate specialty from among a large
group that were available. The concept was that the officer
would serve in an assignment in his alternate specialty after
he was qualified in his basic branch. From that point on he
would rotate between his branch and his alternate specialty
throughout the rest of his career. This process became known
as dual tracking. Thus, with these two specialty
designations, the officer had both a basic branch and an
additional specialty. The MAM selection board picked officers
based on this designation. The process allowed officers from
any of the basic branches to be selected into MAM while
considering a substantial number of alternate specialties for
MAM selection, some of which had little, if any, correlation
to the field of materiel acquisition.
It is also important to note that MAM was neither a branch
nor an alternate specialty, but rather was known as an
additional skill identifier, coded "6T". Upon selection into
MAM, an officer was expected to attend the nine week MAM
training course as his first military school dedicated to
preparing him for assignments as a MAM officer.
The officer was then given an acquisition assignment which
was not necessarily linked to the goal of preparing him as a
program manager. Following this assignment, the officer
returned for an assignment in his basic branch as a. Major in
keeping with the dual track concept. The officer was then to
attend the Program Management Course (PMC) at the Defense
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Systems Management College (DSMC) . Finally, after selection
for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, the officer was
considered for certification as a Materiel Acquisition Manager
by a central board. As a certified acquisition manager, the
officer was then eligible for selection as a program manager,
also performed by a central board.
Although the MAM program was the most applicable and
defined career path to program management within the Army, it
fell short of the desired goals that several studies had
suggested should be achieved for the adequate preparation of
a military program manager. [Ref. 2:p. 201]
First, the MAM program required the officer to dual track
after entry, thus requiring him to serve in his operational
branch to remain competitive for battalion command. This
required him to both prepare to be a program manager and to
remain competitive for battalion command. One retired
Lieutenant General recognized the problem as follows:
There is a
.
widely held belief in the services that the
weapons acquisition process is a "secondary specialty"
that anyone can learn. In reality, we need to create a
program management career and a professional program
management organization—not half a career in acquisition
and half a career in operational commands. I have really
turned around on this point. I used to think that the
fifty-fifty arrangement was the best one. [Ref. 2:p. 191]
Retired Army General Henry A. Miley recognized the same
problem in his comment:
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I don't think you have to fight inside a tank to
experience what a tanker feels.... My vintage has always
disagreed with the idea that you had to serve half your
time in the fighting forces to be a good procurement
officer. I still disagree with that .... If you are
going to produce good procurement officers, you have to
let them work at procurement full time and see a light at
the top. They have to see that the Generals that are in
the procurement business came out of the corps that they
are serving in and not Joe, the combat arms guy, moving in
at the two- and three-star level and cutting off their
chances of promotion. [Ref. 2:p. 199]
The second problem alluded to in the above comment is that
even with the MAM program in place, it was not recognized as
"the path" to success in program management. More disturbing
was the finding by the GAO that:
,
MAM certification is not a prerequisite for appointment as
a program manager. Selection criteria depend on the
specific position but generally include command, program
office and headquarters experience, DSMC training, and
senior service college. Selections are made by a central
board. [Ref. 3:p. 91]
It is clear from this finding that the value of the MAM
program for training Army program managers was dubious.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter briefly described the Packard Commission's
findings with regard to issues in the career development of
military program managers. The MAM program's structure
concluded the chapter. From the Packard Commission and a
review of the Army MAM program along with other literature
surveyed, the following issues were identified for further
research:
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1. Accession and Assignment Policies.
2. Civilian Education.
3. Military Education.
4. Army Acquisition Corps Viability.
5. Army Acquisition Corps Strengths and Weaknesses.
The MAM program as discussed in this chapter will be used
as a baseline for comparison and analysis of the Army
Acquisition Corps. A detailed explanation of the Army
Acquisition Corps is presented in the next chapter
18
III. THE ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will describe and explain the Army
Acquisition Corps (AAC) for use as a reference for evaluations
of program manager (PM) comments. It will allow the reader to
fully understand how the AAC was implemented and what features
are significantly different from the Materiel Acquisition
Management (MAM) program the AAC superseded.
B. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE
The Army Acquisition Corps was established on 13 October
1989 by the Chief of Staff of the Army, then General Carl
Vuono, when he directed that the Army Acquisition Corps
transition and a steady state plan be implemented. [Ref. 5: p.
3] A transition plan was necessary as some Army officers were
too senior to complete the entire AAC career model.
The mission of the AAC is to:
Create a corps of dedicated military and civilian
acquisition managers which capitalizes on the operational
experience of the military officers and the technical
skills of civilians. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
The objective of the AAC is to:
Develop a dedicated pool of highly qualified military and
civilian acquisition specialists to fill designated
critical positions, while ensuring that the development of
systems reflects a balance between keen regard for




A study was conducted to determine the number of officers
required to fill the positions in the Army Acquisition Corps.
The study found that MAM officers from Year Groups 1965
through 1970 numbered more than the vacancies. A year group
includes all officers who received their commission during
that fiscal year. A qualification/validation board was
convened on 11 September 1989 to review the records of all MAM
officers. The board identified officers that met or could
meet the qualifications of the Army Acquisition Corps.
Officers were recommended for either retention or removal
based on Public Laws, DoD directives, and Army policies. [Ref
.
6:p. 3]
MAM officers were notified if they would be retained or
separated. The notification letter clearly explained the new
program, since it involved significant differences from the
earlier MAM program. Each officer considered was given the
opportunity to reclama the board's decision. The letters were
mailed on 22 January 1990 and reclamas were due by 10 March
1990. The reclamas were reviewed during the last two weeks
of March 1990. The results of this board formed the nucleus
of the military component of the AAC, and established the
baseline inventory for the basic branch/year group/ functional
area recruiting effort. [Ref . 6:p. 3]
Year Groups 1965 through 1970 were overstrength. The Army
Chief of Staff approved a selection board to identify those
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officers in the overstrength year groups that were best
qualified to remain in the AAC. This Acquisition Officer
Selection Board met in March 1990 and reviewed the files of
some 529 officers examined by the earlier board. The
selection criteria used were developed by the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) , and included acquisition
qualifications, assignment history, and civil and military
schooling. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
The MAM officer inventory for Year Groups 1971 through
1983 was less than required. The basic branch offices
recruited officers of each of these year groups to meet
requirements based on quotas. Entry criteria were established
to identify the best officers to recruit. The criteria
included acquisition experience, military schooling, civil
education degree, and a fair share distribution of quality
based upon the officer's evaluation reports. Each branch then
provided the Personnel Command Acquisition Accession Board
(PAAB) a list of nominees for review. [Ref . 6:p. 3]
D. STEADY STATE
The second stage of the plan is known as the steady state.
The steady state was composed of those officers junior enough
to complete the entire AAC career development path. The key
departure point occurs at the eighth, year of service. The
first year group to begin the steady state model was Year
Group 1983. Each branch forwarded a list of candidates for
inclusion into the AAC to the Personnel Command Acquisition
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Accession Board (PAAB) that met on 27 March 1990. This PAAB
was composed of program managers and acquisition and branch
representatives. Once the PAAB selected the required number
of officers, they were notified by the Military Acquisition
Management Branch. The officers were instructed to take the
Graduate Record Examination, a standard examination widely
used for admissions decisions to graduate school. This was
done because all AAC officers must earn a Master's Degree to
qualify for retention. Officers accessed were tentatively
awarded a skill identifier of "4M" (non-certified AAC
officer) . The skill identifier would only be retained if the
officer was accepted for the Army Civil School program. The
officer was required to declare primacy in his functional area
and his personnel file was permanently transferred from his
branch to the Military Acquisition Management Branch. [Ref
.
6:p. 4]
The first look at Year Group 1984 was done in October
1990. Year Group 1984 was reviewed in October 1991.
Subsequent year groups will be accessed annually by a PAAB as
an integral part of the AAC steady state process.
E. CAREER DEVELOPMENT MODEL
The first stage of the career development model begins
with commissioning and concludes with selection of the officer
for the AAC by the PAAB. This stage is similar to the first
stage of the MAM program and forms the operational (user)
experience background for the officer. The desired goal is
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for the officer to become wellversed and grounded in the
specifics of his basic branch. This operational experience is
considered essential for the AAC officer in that it lends him
credibility with other members of his branch. The eight years
of service in basic branch assignments encompass the Second
Lieutenant through mid-Captain years. Although each branch
may have particular nuances to declare an officer branch
qualified, all have an established path. As with the MAM
program, the officer serves as a Lieutenant and attends his
branch basic course followed by his first assignment to a
unit. He will typically be a platoon leader and a company
executive officer or serve in comparable positions based on
his branch. The officer attends an advanced course and is
promoted to Captain. He is reassigned to a unit and usually
serves in a staff assignment at the battalion level. Most
importantly, the officer is afforded the opportunity to
command at the company level. He is also required to attend
the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3)
.
This path does not differ at all from the MAM program.
The first departure occurs when the officer requests and
receives a functional area designation. The functional area
is the same as the additional specialty previously described
in the MAM program. Before establishment of the AAC, an
officer could be from any branch and a large number of
additional specialties and still be eligible for the MAM
program. Now under the AAC, this becomes more restrictive.
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The officer can still be from any branch, but now must be from
one of only three functional areas:
1. Research, Development, and Acquisition, (FA51)
;
2. System Automation, (FAS 3) ; and
3. Contracting and Industrial Management, (FA97)
.
An officer holding an Aviation and Intelligence branch
combination (15/35) is also eligible. [Ref. 6:p. 4]
Additionally, the majority of the quota for each year group is
for those officers that hold the functional area, Research,
Development, and Acquisition (FA51) . The functional area
designation process now takes place at about the fifth year.
The PAAB for the selection of candidates is also new and
convenes annually to select officers at the eight year point.
[Ref. 6:p. 4]
Those officers selected by the PAAB are required to follow
procedures for admission to graduate school. The requirement
has been established that all officers in the AAC have a
Master's Degree and upon selection into the AAC, all officers
are provided this opportunity through the Advanced Civil
School (ACS) program. The field of study is designated by
the Army and agreed to by the officer. This program usually
covers a period of from eighteen to twenty-four months.
Although the ACS program is not new, the one-hundred percent
opportunity for AAC selected officers is new and a marked
departure from the MAM program. Upon graduation, the officer
then attends the nine week MAM course. [Ref. 6:p. 5]
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The officer is next assigned to his first acquisition
assignment. This will occur while the officer is a senior
Captain or junior Major based on current promotion statistics.
Since the officer has declared functional area primacy, the
position should be coded for the functional area he holds.
The officer, if selected for intermediate level military
schooling, will attend the Command and General Staff College
(C&GSC) for ten months. If not selected for resident
attendance, the officer will usually complete C&GSC by
correspondence. C&GSC has effectively become a requirement
for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
The officer then receives a second acquisition assignment
based on his functional area. This should take an officer to
his fifteenth to seventeenth year of service. He will then be
sent to the twenty week Program Management Course at the
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) following the second
acquisition assignment. [Ref.6:p. 5]
The AAC officer's record will be reviewed by a board upon
entering the zone of eligibility for promotion to Lieutenant
Colonel. The board will review the records for compliance
with the law, DoD directives and Army policy for certification
as a "4Z" , certified acquisition manager. Those officers who
meet the established criteria will be awarded the "4Z" skill
identifier marking them as certified acquisition managers in
accordance with the law. If the officer is not yet qualified
but could be within two years, he will be retained in the AAC
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as a "4M" . Officers who, for whatever reason, cannot become
certified within the two year period will be disenrolled from
the AAC, and returned to their branch and functional area
career fields. The certified population of officers are those
considered for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, subject to the
promotion floors for AAC officers.
Upon certification and selection for promotion to
Lieutenant Colonel, the officer hc„s completed the second phase
of the AAC career development model. It commenced with
acceptance to the AAC candidate pool and an approved graduate
program and ended with certification and selection for
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.
The last phase of the three phase model is the certified
acquisition manager phase. This phase begins upon
certification and selection for promotion and ends with the
officer's separation from the Army. During this period the
officer serves either as a program manager (PM) if selected by
boards at the Lieutenant Colonel rank or serves in other
positions designated as critical (4Z) and requiring a
certified officer. The officer is considered for attendance
at a senior service college, selection as a project manager,
and for promotion to the rank of Colonel in much the same
manner and by the same type of selection boards that were used
at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. [Ref. 6: p. 5]
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F. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OF THE ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS
The Army Acquisition Corps incorporates significant
changes in the development of its officers based upon the MAM
and earlier programs, and more importantly on the law and DoD
directives.
The first significant change is that the AAC selects or
designates officers from a more restricted population. Only
three functional areas and one branch combination are now
considered for selection with the majority of the selections
from one functional area (FA51) . These areas more
specifically represent the functions and skills that the
various studies found were necessary to produce skilled PMs.
Also, the MAM program was strictly filled on a voluntary basis
versus the AAC which has used a combination of both a "draft"
and volunteers.
The second major change is that all officers selected are
given the opportunity to earn a graduate degree through the
ACS program, an opportunity that in fact, the officer must
take. This should provide an incentive to volunteer for the
program. The MAM program did not require its members to hold
a graduate degree and, although many officers did, they were
not all supported by the ACS program.
Another significant change is the "single tracking"
concept in that once the officer is accessed into the AAC, he
will never again be assigned by his basic .branch. This was
done to address the requirements of the law (Defense
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Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act) and the previous
studies. This is also one of the more controversial issues
within the Army, as reflected by the primary research effort
that will be explained in the next chapter. [Ref. 6:p. 5]
Finally, a very important difference is the Army policy
that AAC officers are not eligible for battalion and higher
level commands. Just as crucial, non-acquisition corps
officers will not be eligible to-be selacted for PM positions,
based on statute requirements. Thus, the two career paths are
unique and distinct. This clearly demonstrates the
seriousness of the decision to join the AAC and the
seriousness of the Army itself to form an exclusive and viable
career path to the position of program manager.
6. SUMMARY
This chapter explained the specifics of the Army
Acquisition Corps. It also highlighted the specific
differences between the AAC and previous programs to
illustrate the large step the Army is taking to improve the
career development of its program managers. The next chapter
is the presentation and analysis of data gained from personal
interviews of fourteen Army program managers.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents and analyzes the information gained
from personal interviews conducted with fourteen Army program
managers. The questions and responses comprise the primary
research of this thesis. These interviews provide an
important source of information in analyzing and evaluating
the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) and its likelihood of success
in better preparing Army officers to serve as program managers
in the future.
This chapter analyzes the AAC based on the previous issues
identified in Chapter II. The current structure and policies
of the AAC will be evaluated using the information from
personal interviews and the literature review. Through this
analysis, the model explained in Chapter III for the career of
an AAC officer can be verified and improved upon.
B. DEMOGRAPHICS OP THE OFFICERS INTERVIEWED
The fourteen interviewees group included thirteen officers
who were program managers at the time of the interview and one
that had completed an assignment as a program manager and was
serving in a command position.
Five officers were assigned at Fort Monmouth, NJ, four at
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, and five at Redstone Arsenal, AL. All
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were involved with programs identified as field artillery
systems
.
Branch representation of the interviewees was: Field
Artillery-7, Ordnance-4, Air Defense-1, Infantry-1, Signal-1.
Functional Area representation was: Research, Development and
Acquisition, FA51-13; System Automation, FA53-1.
Rank and year group representation of the interviewees
was: Colonel-6, Lieutenant Colonel-8; YG65-2, YG67-2, YG68-2,
YG70-2, YG71-3, YG72-1, YG74-2.
Commissioning source representation was: Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTCJ-9, Officer Candidate School (0CS)-3,
United States Military Academy (USMA)-2. All the officers
interviewed held Master's Degrees. The officers' ages ranged
from 42 to 51 with an average age of 45.
C. ISSUE AND INTERVIEW ORIENTATION
Each interview addressed a series of issues on the AAC and
its policies. These issues were selected based on issues
previously identified in Chapter II and on the policies that
have been established by the Army due to recent legislation
and direction provided by the Department of Defense.
Each program managers is identified by a letter together
with that Program manager's comments. This allows the
interviewees freedom from attribution, yet allows the reader
to link the same interviewee's answers to various questions
throughout this chapter. The background of the officers
interviewed is found in Appendix A.
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D. ISSUE ONE: ACCESSION AND ASSIGNMENT POLICIES
The first issue discussed was researched through the use
of four separate questions. The first question dealt with how
the Army would access officers into the AAC. The initial Army
procedure was to consider officers of a number of different
year groups and varying levels of experience , as was explained
in Chapter III. One concern was how to access officers in the
future, as these officers would be the ones junior enough to
complete the entire AAC career development model from start to
finish.
Question One: Should entry into the AAC be strictly bv a
"draft", strictly volunteer, or a combination of draftees
and volunteers?
Nine (64%) of the interviewees favored a combination of a
draft and volunteers for future accessions of officers into
the AAC. The term "draft" used here denotes the fact that
some officers were designated without an option by their basic
branch for accession into the AAC. One such draftee officer
was a Special Forces officer at the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) in the Systems Acquisition Management Curriculum
(817A) . It should be noted that NPS is currently being used
by the Army to fulfill the Master's Degree requirement for
some of the officers of the AAC. The Special Forces officer
was not a volunteer for the AAC and originally was not
particularly happy to have been directed into the AAC.
Comments by PMs in favor of the combination method follow:
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Program Manager B noted, "There is doubt among young
officers as to whether there are any advantages to be in
the AAC." Until such advantages are recognized, he
believed that some of the requirements would have to be
met by directing officers into the AAC who had not
volunteered.
Program Manager F stated that, "A combination method
should be used." He also felt a screening process should
be used to ensure high quality officers are accessed as
determined by their performance based on their Officer
Evaluation Reports (OERs) . He said that there would
probably be a number of volunteers who were not what the
Army would want in terms of quality and that some officers
that might not volunteer, who actually possess valuable
procurement skills and abilities. He felt these desirable
officers should be directed to the AAC.
Program Manager G compared the accession process for the
AAC to the basic branch assignment process. He stated
that not all infantry officers or artillery officers are
in these branches as their first choice. The reality of
the situation dictates that some officers will have skills
the AAC should use and those officers should be accessed
into the AAC, even if they do not volunteer. He went on
to say a number of the Captains that work for him are
reluctant to volunteer for the AAC because they are not
sure that it is "real". These young officers see Generals
who performed well as operational unit commanders but they
do not see Generals that were program managers. They know
that the operational track works and that it will always
be there but they do not have the same level of confidence
in the AAC track. Until young officers have that
confidence, a combination of draftees and volunteers will
be necessary.
Five of the officers interviewed (36%) believed that AAC
accession should be done from strictly a volunteer population,
primarily because they felt that a volunteer system is
inherently better. They saw volunteers as being motivated to
achieve the greatest success and dedicated to a sense of doing
something meaningful . Officers would perform better because
they wanted to "be there".
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Program Manager A stated a volunteer program is infinitely
better. Regardless of the motivation for volunteering,
the performance of a volunteer could be expected to be
better than that of a draftee. Even though a professional
military officer is expected to have the maturity to do
his best at any job, there will always be some small
element of a draftee's performance that will be less than
expected.
Program Manager D stated that though most of his
contemporaries volunteered for the acquisition field,
almost everyone in the field had asked himself, "Why would
anybody in their right mind want to do this?" If an
officer volunteered to enter the AAC, in spite of these
misgivings he will keep on driving. If an officer was
drafted and forced into the field, he would probably not
perform as he really should, looking for the opportunity
to get out of the AAC. This means leaving the Army. It
has to be volunteer. "The stresses as a Battery Commander
(I had sixty-nine months of battery command) are nothing
compared to the stresses of this job."
Program Manager N disagreed with any use of a draft. He
said there were more than enough volunteers in the old
MAM program. With the downsizing of the Army, he felt
there would not be a shortage of volunteers.
The use of a combination of volunteers and draftees
appears to be, at least in the early years, the best method of
obtaining a quality force of dedicated and skilled officers
whose professionalism should ensure acceptance of the AAC by
the rest of the Army. This method is the current AAC
procedure and the majority of the interviewees supported this
combined method of obtaining new officers (64%)
.
Additionally, a quality screen which keeps the AAC from
becoming an escape route for those officers that were unable
to perform well in the operational side of the Army must be
maintained. The ideal situation for the future would be to
have enough volunteers to fill the required number of
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accessions without accepting any who do not meet the quality
screen. This is a realistic goal that can only be achieved if
the AAC survives and prospers as a viable career option. S
next question dealt with the issue of accession and assignment
policies by investigating when a dedicated acquisition career
path should begin. Focus on a single specialty within the
Army is known as "single tracking", which requires an officer
accessed into the Army Acquisition Corps to serve only in
acquisition assignments and to have no further primary
affiliation with his branch. During interviews, this proved
to be a more sensitive topic in that interviewees had not yet
been afforded the opportunity to single track. Single
tracking was instituted to meet laws (especially the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act) and prevent the jumping
between specialties that was described as a problem in Chapter
II.
Question Two; Is single tracking a good idea, and when
should it begin?
Eight officers (57%) indicated single tracking should
occur after the officer has served a tour in a basic branch
assignment as a Major. This appears to reflect a feeling that
user experience in the basic branch is extremely important and
that some of this experience should be as a field grade
officer. Typical comments from these eight officers were:
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Project Manager A stated that it would be best for single
tracking to occur after the officer was certified as an
acquisition manager sometime between the fourteenth and
seventeenth year of service. He stressed the need for
recent user experience in the basic branch.
Project Manager B did not agree with the single tracking
idea at the eighth year. He believed the effect would be
a loss of the "green perspective" that makes a military
officer's background so applicable to the development of
military equipment. He said technology was changing at so
fast a rate that the officer single tracking at the eighth
year would have no experience using the equipment that he
was tasked to replace.
Project Manager F indicated that the early single tracking
idea was not a new concept but he disagreed with it. He
believed he gained much of his user understanding as a
Major in artillery units and as a battalion commander. He
cited a possible time of fifteen years between the last
assignment in the officer's basic branch and assuming a
program manager position as a Colonel and felt this would
cause a lack of credibility with his basic branch peers.
If program manager positions were made branch immaterial,
he could then support the early single track concept.
Project Manager H noted that the Air Force seemed to have
been able to successfully single track their acquisition
officers at an early stage in their careers. However, he
did not believe the Army should do the same and did not
think that program manager positions should be branch
immaterial.
Program Manager K stated that during a period of war, the
idea of single tracking an officer at the eighth year
would hurt the Army. He believed that these officers
would be needed in combat leadership positions in their
basic branch but would not have the skill or experience to
be effective in that role.
Six officers (43%) agreed with single tracking an officer
at his eighth year of service upon accession into the AAC.
This is in agreement with current Army policy. Representative
comments follow:
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Project Manager D felt there was no other choice. He said
officers of his era tried to be competitive on both the
operational side for battalion command and on the
acquisition side for program management. "If you try to
do both, one side or the other is short changed." The
burden is with the AAC officer himself to stay current in
his basic branch.
Project Manager G believed the AAC concept is the way of
the future. He had two artillery assignments in twenty-
four years of service. He stated that true exposure to
soldiers ends at company level. The officer should be
branch qualified before selection for the AAC. There
simply is not enough time to prepare as an operational
officer and as an acquisition manager. "If you tell him
it is possible to do both, he hedges his bets." This
interviewee gave the most compelling argument against
returning to a branch assignment as a Major:
You learned all you will ever learn about what the soldier
really does when you were a Captain and Lieutenant, and
after that technical experience not field experience,
keeps you up to date with your branch. You get that
through being associated with projects or staff work in
support of your branch. If you went back, odds are you
would never make it to a battalion. I don't think with a
'regreening' tour an AAC officer would ever see a tactical
unit. What has changed in the artillery since you served
as a commander as a Captain, the equipment, and that came
from the material development community where the AAC
officer would be working."
Two of the six program managers who supported single tracking
at the eighth year cited the time needed to work in
acquisition assignments before serving as a program manager as
the key driver of this policy. The AAC single tracking
concept was supported by a minority of the interviewees (43%)
Those that opposed single tracking based their answer on their
preference for user experience as a Major. An important
consideration should be noted here. This option was not
available to any of the officers interviewed. Therefore,
there may be a bias for the interviewees to believe that the
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way they were developed (two specialties) is the best
approach. Unless the current AAC policy is followed, the
amount of acquisition experience that officers will have prior
to selection as PMs may not significantly improve. Thus, in
the vital area of increased acquisition experience, the AAC
would not accomplish the desired end and the minority opinion
here that supports the current AAC policy is recommended by
the researcher.
Once an AAC officer is accessed and educated, he is ready
for his first acquisition assignment. Most likely, he will be
either a senior Captain or a junior Major and will naturally
seek the best assignments to prepare himself for a program
manager position. However, the jobs which best accomplish
this are not clearly established and known by young officers.
Unlike the operational officer, who knows the key jobs to
get at these ranks for preparation as a battalion commander,
the AAC officer does not have the advantage of institutional
knowledge to guide his preferences. It is important,
therefore , to try to identify and publicize those positions
which make the AAC officer competitive for selection as a
program manager. The officers interviewed appear to be a
valuable source of this information for two reasons. First,
they must have done the "right" jobs as they were selected to
be program managers. Secondly, as program managers they
should know what previous positions best provided them with
the skills needed to manage their current responsibilities.
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Question Three: For the AAC officer's first and
subsequent assignments, what are the jobs and positions
that will best prepare and develop him to become a program
manager?
All fourteen (100%) officers said an assignment to a
program office was a prime developmental position. They
agreed that this was the only place to get the complete
picture of what managing a program was all about. Six
officers said this was the best possible developmental
position for an AAC officer hoping to become a program
manager. These positions are identified on manning documents
as Assistant Program Manager and, in some cases, are coded for
Captains and Majors. They usually involve testing, readiness,
material fielding, or logistics. Any of these would develop
an AAC officer in the view of the officers interviewed. A
number of interviewees did not have authorization for an
Assistant Program Manager (APM) and saw this as a major
problem. They agreed the workload was there to support a
military officer and said action should be taken to create
more positions for military officers at the ranks of Captain
and Major to staff program offices.
All fourteen officers (100%) mentioned working in the
testing community as excellent developmental experience. They
recognized that testing was only a slice of program
management, but agreed it was a critical slice that would
provide a young officer with an excellent background to become
a program manager. Testing assignments could be either
developmental or operational. The specific agencies mentioned
38
were Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) , Test and
Evaluation Command (TECOM) , Combat Systems Test Activity
(CSTA) , and Test and Experimental Command (TEXCOM) . These
were viewed as important since all programs must undergo
testing to demonstrate their effectiveness.
Nine officers (64%) identified procurement command
assignments as being excellent (e.g. Communications and
Electronics Command (CECOM) , Missile Command (MICOM) , Tank and
Automotive Command (TACOM) , etc.). Within these commands,
many positions for military officers exist. The interviewees
favored those jobs where the officer would work in a
functional directorate tasked to provide matrix support to
program management offices. Some programs are too small in
dollar value to be managed by a board selected officer and
they normally are managed by Captains and Majors. These
programs exist at the procurement commands. This was viewed
as being invaluable acquisition experience.
Seven officers (50%) listed Department of the Army staff
positions in the Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development and Acquisition (SARDA) and the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) as good acquisition experience
assignments. The typical jobs in these agencies are as action
officers representing the programs and responding to Congress,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other
agencies on funding and technical program matters. This was
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viewed as giving the officer a clearer understanding of the
political dimensions of the acquisition process.
Six officers (43%) believed that working for a Training
and Doctrine System Manager (TSM) would be beneficial. This
is the requirements part of the process. Positions exist at
all basic branch schools and allow the AAC officer to work
closely with the user in defining equipment needed and
performance requirements
.
It should be noted that jobs mentioned by less than five
(36%) of the interviewees were not listed.
The young AAC officer who aspires to be certified as an
acquisition manager (4Z) and to ultimately be selected as a
program manager should be aware of the best developmental
positions that will allow him to achieve these goals. The
officer in the traditional operational track who aspires to
command at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and beyond is well
aware of the premier positions at the rank of senior Captain
and Major. The overwhelming majority of Lieutenant Colonels
selected for command have previously served as a battalion
level executive officer (XO) or operations officer (S-3)
.
They have generally tried to serve in these positions for as
long as possible and have received outstanding performance
evaluations while in these demanding duty assignments. The
common knowledge among operational Army officers is that
superior performance in these positions leads to promotion,
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command, and school selection. This fact is repeatedly
verified by selection board results.
Unfortunately, with the lack of such historical
precedence, there is less certainty among AAC officers as to
which developmental positions will make one most competitive
for promotion, advanced schooling and selection as a PM.
Interviewees were a valuable source of information in
indentifying the best developmental positions, based on their
responses during the interviews and by examining their own
assignments. Each interviewee supplied the researcher with a
copy of his own Officer Record Brief (ORB)
.
The PMs interviewed had very strong feelings regarding
which particular positions would best prepare the AAC officer
from the time of accession to the Lieutenant Colonel promotion
board and Program Manager selection board.
The clear choice for the best position to have served in
and succeeded at was that of Assistant Program Manager (APM)
.
Every interviewee (100%) mentioned this and at least six
stated that it was absolutely "the best" developmental
position for an AAC officer in preparing him as a sucessful
program manager. The researcher's review of the interviewees'
ORBs reflected that seven (50%) had served as APMs earlier in
their careers. This is clearly the position in the AAC most
comparable to the battalion XO or S-3 position for the
operational officer. The APM position allows the officer to
work directly with the PM in much the same manner that the XO
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or S-3 works with the Battalion Commander. It is also the
only developmental position in which the officer is able to
observe and become involved in the complete realm of duties
and responsibilities of program management.
In order to provide sufficient developmental positions,
more than one APM authorization for each PM position would be
extremely beneficial. In reality, the researcher observed
quite a different situation. Of the thirteen current program
managers interviewed, only five APM positions for either a
Captain or Major existed on authorization documentation. This
appears to be very insufficient for the Army's needs. In a
few cases, the PMs had officers working for them as APMs, in
effect, but not by authorization. The officers they used as
APMs were detailed to them from other offices at the same
installation. This indicates that some action is necessary to
authorize additional APM positions. Perhaps, at the very
least, one APM position per PM position should be established.
There was general agreement among the interviewees that the
work to support these additional APM positions existed, that
they would welcome such a move in additional authorizations,
and that even though a program goes through various stages in
its life cycle, meaningful and demanding work for an APM would
always exist. It is clear to the researcher based on these
observations that this is one aspect of the AAC that needs
further study and action.
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The interviewees' second choice for a developmental
assignment is best described as a testing position. Although
it was mentioned by all the interviewees (100%) , not everyone
thought it was "the best" developmental position. Although
testing is an extremely important part of virtually any
program's development, it is only a part of the acquisition
picture with which the program manager must be concerned.
There was a feeling that an officer working in the testing
arena would not get the macro-view. A review of the ORBs
showed that six officers (43%) had testing experience in a
previous assignment. Opportunities exist for AAC officers in
both developmental and operational testing. Examples of
testing assignments are found in such Army agencies such as
OPTEC, TECOM, and TEXCOM.
The next best developmental assignment in the eyes of the
PMs interviewed is found in the procurement commands, such as
CECOM, MICOM, TACOM, etc. Nine officers (64%) mentioned this
in their interviews. Two types of positions in these commands
were specifically mentioned. The first is working in a
functional directorate of the command providing matrix support
to the program management offices. Also mentioned were
positions in which an officer serves as a mini-PM, managing
smaller programs not requiring a board selected PM. A review
of the ORBs indicated seven of the officers (50%) had a
previous assignment of this type.
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Finally , the only other developmental assignment mentioned
by at least half of the officers was working on the Department
of the Army Staff, particularly SARDA or DCSOPS. Seven
officers (50%) mentioned this as a good developmental
assignment for the AAC officer. Within these agencies are a
number of positions that would expose the AAC officer to the
political process and funding procedures, which effect program
management. All interviewees believed these to be an
important aspect of program management.
The final analysis of the "best" developmental positions
is that an APM is the only job for the AAC officer that
prepares him in the same manner as the XO or S-3 job prepares
the operational officer for battalion command. The other
three positions listed above would be better considered as
good first acquisition assignments to be performed prior to
working as an APM in a program management office. Each of the
three supports the AAC officer in learning the skills and
procedures that are needed to serve as a program manager.
The last question associated with accession and assignment
policies addressed duration and time of program manager
reassignment. Past studies have criticized the length of




Question Four: What is a good guide to use for the length
of assignment as a program manager and when should program
managers be reassigned?
Twelve. officers (86%) stated that an either/or method of
minimum time or completion of a milestone should be used with
the minimum times being three years in Lieutenant Colonel
positions and four years in Colonel positions. This is in
agreement with current Army policy. Representative of these
responses were the following:
Program Manager A noted, "Milestones do not apply to my
program. Block modification has no formal milestones,
just some wickets. Ideally it should be at completion of
a phase. Three years is a good average, but it is program
dependent .
"
Program Manager B stated, "It is very hard to set a tenure
time. It should be done on a case-by-case basis so a
length of time or achievement of a milestone will work."
Program Manager C said, "Either way, a time or a milestone
will work. There have been three PMs before me over a
period of three years. One left for personal reasons and
one was not a '4Z'. A person should sign up. The PM
should be required to annually brief the baseline to the
Program Executive Officer (PEO) to eliminate focus on
short term objectives."
Program Manager D commented, "It is hard to set a policy
but this is a good general one. You need to talk to the
actual PM. Life cycle has an effect and the later stages
of a program are more difficult but I agree with reducing
volatility.
"
Program Manager F stated, "This has been a credible
argument as I believe tenure has been a problem. You




Program Manager G noted, "The personnel policy is always
going to supersede the management policy. I was selected
to go to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
and could not turn it down without damaging my potential
advancement opportunities so this is cause for a policy
change. Using milestones is best, but I do not know if it
is feasible. You should carry your program through a
milestone.
"
Program Manager H said, "Yes, it is effective and better
than it was. By law, there is a thirty day overlap
required between the outgoing and incoming PM. It must be
done at a 'make sense' point."
Program Manager N believed, "The problem was exaggerated.
It is not a big problem and stability statements are not
necessary.
One officer (7%) said only the use of time was best and
one officer (7%) said only using milestones made sense. The
comment supporting exclusive milestone use was:
Program Manager I said, "No, the current policy will not
serve our needs. The cost problems are not due to
rotation policy with PMs. The tenure should be to a
milestone. It should be event driven, not time driven."
The stability issue raised by frequent turnover of Army
program managers has been targeted and addressed through the
use of minimum time in conjunction with the use of milestone
achievement. The program managers were strongly in favor of
this method (86%) . This problem should be effectively solved
by the time/milestone rotation policy of the AAC.
Additionally, the AAC has adopted a policy of a thirty day
overlap between the outgoing and incoming program manager that
should further improve the transition from one program manager
to his successor. The only other action necessary is to allow
incumbent program managers to be deferred for attendence at
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the Senior Service Colleges until they meet the AAC tenure
guideline (i.e. priority to program manager tours)
.
B. ISSUE TWO: CIVILIAN EDUCATION
The next two questions were asked to determine the
interviewees' thoughts regarding the level and type of
civilian education that officers of the AAC should possess.
One research source stated that the first requirement for an
officer wishing to enter the MAM program was to have a degree
in engineering or a physical science. [Ref. 7: p. 7] The only
exception would be for a graduate of one of the military
academies, and then only if the officer concentrated in
engineering. [Ref. 7:p. 7] The question was asked to
determine what type(s) of undergraduate degrees were
preferred, or even required.
Question One: Is there a need to require a specific
undergraduate degree for officers of the AAC? If so,
which onefs)? If not, whv not?
Thirteen (93%) of the officers did not believe that a
specific degree or degrees, at the undergraduate level, should
be required for officers to be accessed into the AAC.
Responses ranged from preference for a specific degree to no
preferene for any particular undergraduate field. Respondents
supporting no requirement for a specific undergraduate degree
is in keeping with current Army policy. Interviewees stated
the following:
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Program Manager A stated that a specific technical
undergraduate degree was not essential and maybe not even
absolutely preferable for a PM. "This is management. I
have a number of technical people that work for me."
Program Manager B, who had an undergraduate engineering
degree, said that most of his time is not spent looking at
technical problems or problems that require an engineering
degree
.
Program Manager C said that his technical people are able
to explain the technical details.
Program Manager D favored an undergraduate engineering
degree. It would be better for a program manager to have
technical expertise and let his business management people
run the business end of the program than for a program
manager to be a business expert and rely on his technical
experts to carry out the technical side. Therefore, he
would not make it an absolute requirement but would favor
the engineering degree.
Program Manager E stated that going into the acquisition
corps, you should have a technical background versus a
history or a bachelor of arts degree because you are
dealing in the technical world. If you are not
technically oriented you are going to have a difficult
time. "I don't think it is a mandatory thing. I think
you need to look at what the officer has done subsequent
to his undergraduate degree."
Program Manager F commented that the first question he was
asked upon his selection as a PM concerned his ability to
handle the engineering aspects of his program. He felt
that if a project manager has to rely on his own
engineering expertise to get the job done effectively,
then the Army has done something drastically wrong. "My
job is not engineering, my job is the management and
leadership of the program. If the credential for coming
in was engineering, I wouldn't be here. Every job you go
into in the Army you are not 100% prepared for. If you
can accomplish the discipline of a graduate program like
the one at the Naval Postgraduate School or others, you
can handle what you are going to be confronted with in
this business."
Program Manager G stated the ideal manager has an
engineering Bachelor's and a management Master's. An
officer with an engineering undergraduate degree would be
good, but it should not be a requirement.
48
Program Manager I stated that although an engineering
degree would be preferred, a non-technical degree does not
mean that an officer is not capable of doing the job as a
PM. One assimilates technical expertise as time goes by.
Program Manager K said: "I don't care if you're a piano
major, as long as you have a degree at the bachelor level,
it should not be a problem."
One officer (7%) thought a more specific set of criteria
should be used. He firmly believed that the undergraduate
degree should be in a scientific discipline (either
engineering or science) , or business. He indicated that this
should be a requirement for accession into the AAC. Program
Manager H then defended his rationale by stating:
The program management field is not all technical and it's
'not all business, but it is mainly business. Yet, if you
do not understand the basic concepts of physics, you are
going to get lost in this business.
The program managers interviewed strongly believed that
officers selected for the AAC need not have any specific
undergraduate degree (93%) . Only two (14%) of them had
engineering degrees at the undergraduate level. The
prevailing opinion was that the undergraduate degree had
little to do with chances of success as a program manager.
The main consideration with the undergraduate work of AAC
officers was that it must be of a quality to be accepted for
graduate study. One of the two officers that held an
undergraduate engineering degree mentioned that since
technology improves at such a rapid rate, his engineering
degree had been of little use to him in his program management
position.
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The officers interviewed held a diverse assortment of
undergradate degrees including history, education, and
zoology. Not one felt hindered by holding an undergraduate
degree in a non-technical field. Thus, the AAC should
continue to access officers regardless of specific
undergraduate degree as has been done. To do otherwise would
limit possible selections without good cause. The key point
is accessing officers whose undergraduate record indicates
likely success in graduate work based on undergraduate
performance.
The second question concerning civilian education
addressed the value of graduate education and the preferred
field of study. The AAC has incorporated significant change
over the MAM program in this area. General Carl Vuono ( USA,
ret.) established a 100% opportunity for AAC officers of Year
Group 1983 and beyond to participate in the Army's Advanced
Civil Schools (ACS) program. This is a fully funded program
whereby an officer's full time study is paid for by the Army.
One's full time job is to earn a degree specificied by the
Army to support AAC requirements. The officer is assigned to
the United States Army Student Detachment, Fort Benjamin
Harrison, Indiana. His orders state "with duty at" and the
institution he is to attend. Upon notification that he has
been accessed into the AAC, the officer is directed to apply
to a specific educational institution for a specific degree
program. The officer must gain acceptance to a graduate
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program to remain in the AAC. A limited number of officers
hold a graduate degree upon entry to active duty. Thus, it is
possible that some AAC officers will not participate in the
ACS program. The interviewees were questioned as to their
thoughts on this process.
Question Two: Should a graduate degree be required for AAC
officers, in a specific discipline, and do you support the
use of the ACS program for all officers accessed into the
AAC?
Eleven officers (79%) agreed with the current AAC policy
of requiring a graduate degree in specific discipline (s) and
the use of the ACS program to accomplish this goal. Their
reasons were varied and were expressed in a number of ways:
Program Manager D stated that a graduate degree should be
required and that the favored degree should be an MBA or
a program similar to the one taught at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) called the Systems Acquisition
Management (817A) curriculum. He himself held an MBA from
a civilian institution and noted, upon examining a matrix
of the NPS 817A courses, said that the big difference was
that the NPS program was aimed towards military
application. A civilian program is more broadly based
whereby the officer would have to pick and choose what
applied to him. He said he liked the looks of the NPS
program.
Program Manager E believed that a graduate degree was
essential and supported the use of the ACS program saying
the Army should provide the time and the funding. He also
stated that the MBA degree was good but not necessarily
the best graduate degree. He believed that technical
advanced degrees should also be included for the AAC
officer. Upon seeing the NPS 817A program, he called it
a "maxi PM course" and noted its similarity with the
Program Management Course taught at the Defense Systems
Management College.
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Program Manager F commented that the requirement to get a
graduate degree forces an intellectual disciplining of an
officer. There is a degree of motivation, independence,
and analytical skill for graduate study which are
invaluable in this business. He supported graduate
schooling. "There are engineering skills and mathematics
skills that are beneficial which you only get through
graduate study that help you in this job. If you don't
provide the opportunity for all, it then becomes an
artificial discriminator for selection boards. The Army
has had fully funded graduate study for other positions
such as the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, Military
Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) teaching
assignments, and comptrollers. The choice of study has to
be limited to applicable degrees. Along with management
degrees there may be a need for some more technical
degrees." Program Manager F also noted the similarity
between the NPS 817A program and the DSMC PM course and
thought that the possibility of redundancy existed.
Program Manager G supported the AAC graduate ACS program
and said a graduate degree should be a requirement. He
believed the graduate degree should be in a management
field unless the officer had an undergraduate management
degree. Upon comparing the NPS 817A program with his
experience at the DSMC PM course and as an ICAF graduate
he said the officer from NPS with an 817A degree would be
"bored to death" at the DSMC PM course because of the
likeness between the two.
Program Manager J stated that a graduate degree should be
required. He believed that the tools and skills gained as
an undergraduate would not be sufficient and that the
necessary skills and tools are taught at the graduate
level. He also stated if you are going to make this a
requirement, then the resources (time and money) should be
provided.
Program Manager K said that he supported the AAC graduate
education policy to ensure a high level of quality among
officers of the AAC. He believed this would provide an
incentive in two ways: first, younger officers would
recognize the quality of highly educated seniors and be
attracted to follow their lead, and second, the benefit of
the funding and time to get a graduate degree.
Two officers (14%) did not agree with the current AAC
policy of requiring a graduate degree and consequently did
not concur with the use of the ACS program for all officers of
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the AAC. Their general feeling was that a graduate degree was
a "ticket punching" exercise and that the time spent in the
ACS program could be better spent in acquisition assignments.
These officers expressed doubts as to the necessity of a
graduate degree to perform well as a program manager. Also,
one officer said that it was creating a wrong mentality among
the officer corps. That same officer believed that the Army's
military school system provided the officer with the
educational background he would need as a program manager.
Representative comments were:
Program Manager B did not agree that a graduate degree be
a necessity. He stated the necessity was to be able to
think and to understand. Although he agreed an MBA might
be helpful in some cases for a program manager, it should
not be a requirement. He further stated that he could
survive in his job fairly easily without an advanced
degree, although he had one.
Program Manager C said he strongly disagreed with the
mentality that you must have a graduate degree to be a
good program manager. Nowhere in civilian industry is a
graduate degree a requirement to be a program manager. "I
really do not think that a graduate degree is necessary
and I strongly disagree with that mentality. If that
happens we are getting into ticket punching."
One officer (7%) conditioned his response. Program
Manager M did not believe a graduate degree should be a
requirement. He acknowledged that education was beneficial
and that it would be impossible to have too much education.
However, although he thought the AAC concept was positive, he
did not believe that there was enough time for an officer to
attend school for two years as a senior Captain and still meet
the requirements for the amount of time spent in acquisition
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assignments. Therefore, his support of graduate education was
conditional.
All the officers interviewed held one or more graduate
degrees. The fully funded graduate schooling was soundly
supported (79%) as part of the AAC career path. A number of
reasons were cited for supporting fully funded graduate study.
The fact that a graduate degree is normally an expensive and
time consuming prospect was noted, thus the policy should
serve as an incentive to officers considering the AAC. Also,
the skills learned in the graduate programs could be
specifically applied to positions in the acquisition field.
Also noted was the mental discipline involved in successfully
completing a graduate program, a necessary element for success
in the fast moving world of program management.
Unlike the notion of AAC officers holding a wide range of
undergraduate degrees in different disciplines, there was a
strong feeling that only a limited number of graduate degree
programs should be used for AAC officers. The most frequently
mentioned degree helpful in the acquisition field was a
graduate degree in management. Although most agreed an M.B.A.
would be helpful, there was a strong belief that almost any
type of management graduate degree that included business,
statistics, accounting, and economics courses would be
extremely helpful to any officer working in program
management. An advanced degree in engineering was also viewed
as applicable, but only for very technical programs in which
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the officer's duties would require a detailed personal
knowledge of engineering principles. Many of the PMs
interviewed noted that they had engineers on their staffs and
needed only to have a general understanding of the engineering
challenges of their respective programs, leaving the technical
details to the trained engineers that worked for them. The
AAC's current model for inclusion of fully funded advanced
civil schooling was supported by the responses of the PMs
interviewed.
F. ISSUE THREE: MILITARY EDUCATION
The AAC officer is expected to complete all the military
educational schools that were described in Chapter III.
Interviewees were asked about military education to gauge
their feelings on the usefulness and applicability of such
military education. The first question on the military
education system was:
Question One; Should officers of the AAC continue to .
attend a branch basic course and advanced course?
All fourteen (100%) officers interviewed agreed with the
continued use of these two schools. This is in agreement with
the AAC model. A suggestion was made during one interview
that each basic and advanced course program of instruction
include a block of instruction on the AAC to educate officers
early in their careers. The interviewee believed this would
assist in educating the officers about the AAC since it is
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such a new career option and will draw its members from all
the Army's basic branches.
The officers were then queried about their feelings on the
Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) . None of the
interviewees had attended this school. Completion of this
school is required for all officers of Year Groups 1981 and
later. It consists of a correspondence phase, to be completed
before the nine week resident phase. This course must be
completed before one begins the Command and General Staff
Course.
Question Two: Is CAS3 necessary for the AAC officer?
Again, all fourteen officers (100%) agreed with the
requirement for this course. There was a general feeling that
it is an effective course in teaching good staff techniques
and skills. It was also noted that this is the first military
course where officers from all of the branches are able to
share the diversity of their experiences thus enriching their
educational interaction.
The courses mentioned above are all normally completed
within the first eight years of an officer's career. Since
accession of AAC officers occurs at the eighth year, these
courses would normally be completed prior to an officer's
entry into the AAC. Therefore, an AAC officer's military
schooling would be identical to that of an operational
officer's for the first eight years of service. Thus, as
would be expected, the interviewees fully supported these
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early military courses. They serve as the foundation for an
officer's expertise within his basic branch. Since these
courses normally occur within the first eight years of service
they do not interfere with the education and training unique
to the AAC officer. These courses form the common ground
among both the AAC officer and the operational officer who
uses the equipment the AAC officer is responsible for
acquiring. These schools should continue to be required for
the AAC officer in order to prevent erosion of the
acquisition-user relationship.
Upon accession into the AAC, the current policy is to send
all officers to the nine week Material Acquisition Management
course at Fort Lee, Virginia. This is the first military
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school an AAC officer attends which is focused on Army
acquisition. It serves as a basic course for the AAC officer
and gives him a base to build upon by introducing him to
acquisition specific matters and terminology.
Question Three: Should the MAM course be utilized by the
AAC officer?
Thirteen (93%) of the officers interviewed supported the
use of the MAM course in the AAC career model. It was viewed
as a helpful introduction for officers who had not yet worked
in the acquisition environment. The interviewees believed
that it gave a solid foundation for the new AAC officer and
provided a common ground for officers entering the program
from the various basic branches. Some mentioned that they had
sent both civilians and military officers to the course in the
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past. This was usually accomplished soon after a newly
arrived and inexperienced person was assigned to their
program, whether as a core program office member or as part of
the matrix support structure. The interviewees emphasized
that the course was useful only for those who had little or no
knowledge or experience in the military acquisition
environment.
One officer (7%) described it as a "no value added "
course. This caused him to doubt the wisdom in sending all
new AAC officers to the course.
The MAM course enjoyed strong support (93%) . It should
continue to be used to educate officers entering the AAC. The
MAM course becomes, in effect, the basic course for all AAC
officers. Attendence at the MAM course should occur either
immediately before or after the graduate schooling, and
certainly before the officer arrives at his first acquisition
assignment. PMs indicated the course would have diminished
value once an officer had worked in an acquisition assignment
for any length of time. By then, his work experience should
have given him familiarity with the procedures and language
unique to the field of military acquisition.
The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is the next
military school in the hierarchy. This school differs from
the other military schools mentioned above in a few
significant ways. The officers that attend this school are
Captains, selected for promotion, or Majors. The officer
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typically attends this school between his twelfth and
fifteenth year of service. Students come from all branches of
the Army. An officer must be selected by a board to attend
and only the top half of a year group is selected. Selection
is competitive and serves as a signal to an officer of his
standing among his contemporaries. The school is ten months
in length and is located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The
course of instruction is vast in scope and gives a macro view
of the Army to prepare the officer for high level staff
assignments and command at battalion level. The course can
also be completed by correspondence, and in fact all officers
not selected to attend as residents ar'e advised to enroll and
complete the correspondence course as it has become a virtual
requirement for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Although the
Officer Record Brief (ORB) does not distinguish whether the
course was completed as a resident or by correspondence, there
is a measure of prestige for those officers who are selected
to attend the resident course.
The AAC model has incorporated this school in the career
path. However, since the AAC officer will be single tracking
in acquisition assignments at this point, some have suggested
that the course be eliminated as a part of the AAC model. [Ref
.
7: p. 7] This idea has been rather controversial, with strong
factors established for both positions.
The Program Management (PM) course taught at the Defense
Systems Management College (DSMC) , Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is
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the second school in the AAC model specifically geared for the
AAC officer and is outside of the military schooling required
for the operational officer. The course is six months in
length and students come from all Services. Civilians, from
both the private sector and Government are also able to
attend. The program of instruction is designed to prepare the
attendee to serve as a program manager. This course is
required by law for an officer to serve as a certified program
manager. [Ref. 8] The PM course has been discussed as a
possible substitute for CGSC in meeting the Military Education
Level Four (MEL-4) requirement for promotion to Lieutenant
Colonel. Army attendees are usually Majors or junior
Lieutenant Colonels between their twelfth and eighteenth year
of service.
Using the premise that the AAC officer is accessed at the
eighth year and immediately attends the MAM course and two
years of graduate school, he now has between ten and eleven
years of service before his first acquisition assignment. At
current promotion points, he has approximately five to seven
years to complete two acquisition assignments, each of three
years in duration and eighteen months of school between CGSC
and the PM courses. This is the basis for concern under which
the following question of the value of resident CGSC has been
discussed.
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Question Four: Is CGSC necessary for the AAC officer, or
are there better alternatives that could be used or
developed to fulfill the MEL-4 requirement?
Eight officers (57%) believed that C&GSC should be
included in the career path for an AAC officer and were
opposed to changing policy and making the PM course a MEL-4
equivalent for AAC officers. This is consistent with current
Army policy and the AAC career model. They stressed the
importance of CGSC in giving them credibility with the user
that they represent. The course was also mentioned as
important to an understanding of the entire Army and the way
it operates. One officer stated that when one is selected to
attend CGSC, he does not know to which type of program he will
be assigned. The course gives a broad appreciation of each of
the branches and how they fit on the battlefield. Also cited
as valuable by this group was the interaction between the
students who go on to become the senior officers of the Army
in all branches. The doctrine taught was said to be essential
in briefings to various agencies that have an effect on a
program's survival. Interviewees mentioned that even Army
doctors and lawyers go to the school, thus it would be unwise
to exclude AAC officers.
One officer who had attended both CGSC and the PM course
said that there was no comparison and that CGSC was much more
demanding. However, this same officer said that if the AAC
officer does not go back to a basic branch assignment with
troops as a Major, then there is much less need for CGSC. The
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combat arms approach that the school teaches was cited as
necessary for success as a program manager. Another officer
noted that since the AAC officer left the traditional
operational track as a Captain, the course would be necessary
to learn and use doctrine.
Six officers (43%) were in favor of making the PM course
a Military Education Level Four (MEL-4) equivalent and using
it for members of the AAC instead of CGSC. The limited time
for acquisition assignments was cited as the rationale. Also,
one officer observed that spending a year learning how to
maneuver a division around the battlefield is simply not a
good use of the AAC officer's time. He further stated that it
is important to remember the AAC officer's operational art is
material acquisition which is what the PM course teaches. The
officers holding this view thought it possible to extend the
PM course to include essential items from CGSC.
The value of the Command and General Staff College course
to the AAC officer is difficult to assess. A smaller number
of the officers interviewed supported continued use of this
course for the AAC officer than for the previously mentioned
courses. All the officers interviewed had credit for MEL-4,
most through resident attendence at CGSC. The important
question is whether the year of resident attendence at this
course is more valuable than a year's experience in an
acquisition assignment. Currently, attendence at the resident
CGSC has been incorporated into the AAC officer's career path.
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Because the course is a requirement for promotion, only an
official change in Army policy would allow for AAC officers to
forego completing CGSC and still hope to achieve promotion to
Lieutenant Colonel
.
The interviewees were next asked:
Question Five: Was the DSMC PM course helpful to you;
should it be required for AAC officers?
Thirteen officers (93%) said the PM course was extremely
helpful for them in their jobs as program managers. One
officer (7%) said he could only feel lukewarm about the course
because he went to it directly from the Naval War College and
was probably "burnt out" from that experience. He also stated
that the course was too broadly focused to be of great help.
The thirteen officers who described it as extremely
helpful had some important concerns. The most common issue
was that the person attending should have previous working
experience in acquisition assignments. A few of the officers
had not worked in a program management office before attending
and, although they felt it was a good course, they said it
would have been much more beneficial had they had PMO
experience.
One interviewee made an important point. He had served as
a member of a product manager selection board which did not
use the PM course as a requirement for selection. The board
simply scheduled selected officers for the course before
becoming a program manager. He believed the method should be
continued.
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The Defense Systems Management College Program Manager
course enjoyed strong support among the PMs interviewed (93%)
.
This course was viewed as necessary preparation prior to
assuming duties as a PM. This is part of the current AAC
model and credit for it, or an unnamed equivalent, is required
by current law to assume duties as a program manager. [Re f. 8]
Unforunately, completion of this course in and of itself
does not yield MEL-4 credit. On.ce the officer enters the AAC,
his operational art becomes primarily the field of materiel
development. Because of this the PM course should become the
way for the AAC officer to achieve the MEL-4 credit that is
required for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel . This would have
a few positive effects. First, it would allow more
operational officers to attend the resident CGSC course
through the separation of intermediate level schooling for AAC
versus operational track Army officers. The limited number of
slots for resident CGSC has been a concern. The vacancies
created by those AAC officers who would have attended resident
CGSC could be more effectively used by those officers who
would remain in the operational track for the duration of
their Army service. Secondly, the year that the AAC officer
would have spent in CGSC could be more effectively utilized
gaining experience in an acquisition assignment. Finally, it
would allow the AAC officer to remain in his first acquistion
assignment longer.
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The highest level of military education is selection for
Senior Service College (MEL-1) . Officers who attend are
selected by a board for both resident and correspondence
methods of completing this level of education.
The Army War College is the primary source of MEL-1 Army
officers but the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
is also a MEL-1 school and more closely fits the AAC officer's
needs
.
Question Six: What course should AAC officers attend for
MEL-1 credit?
Eleven officers (79%) said ICAF should be used for AAC
officers to attain MEL-1 credit. Of these, six believed the
AAC officer should only be sent to ICAF. The other five,
although favoring ICAF, did not agree with restricting AAC
officers to ICAF or preventing non-AAC officers from attending
ICAF. Three officers (21%) had no preference with regard to
which course was used for MEL-1 credit for AAC officers. The
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) appears to be
the school of choice for the interviewees. There is no reason
to prevent an operational track officer from attending ICAF
but it should be related to his subsequent assignments.
G. ISSUE FOUR: ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS VIABILITY
All interviewees were asked if the AAC should evolve
further, such as into its own basic branch. If the AAC were
to become a branch, then officers could serve in the field
upon their entry to active duty. The effect would be that an
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officer's experience would be totally involved in the
development and procurement of equipment. The officer would
have no tie to, or experience in any of the existing basic
branches
.
Question One: Should the Army Acquisition Corps become a
branch?
Thirteen officers (93%) stated the AAC should not become
its own basic branch. They felt that experience in a warfare
basic branch assignment was the best possible preparation for
a young officer. One PM put it in perspective when he told
the researcher that if the AAC became a basic branch the only
difference between an Army officer and a civilian in the AAC
would be the clothing they wear. The civilian would wear a
suit and the officer would wear a uniform but there would be
no difference in the background and experience that each would
bring to their positions in the acquisition field. The
possibility of a loss of credibility between the AAC officer
and the traditional Army officer who represented an
operational unit would be severely exacerbated. The common
background between the AAC military personnel and the
traditional operational Army personnel would be virually
eliminated resulting in a mistake of grave consequences.
One officer (7%) said he could see the AAC evolving into
a branch and did not necessarily think this would be
unhealthy.
The Army has not made the AAC a branch, thus AAC officers
currently represent all basic branches of the Army. The
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researcher is unaware of any plan or desire to make the AAC a
basic branch now or anytime in the foreseeable future.
However, there is precedent for such a concept. The Aviation
Branch evolved from an alternate specialty (functional area)
into a basic branch during the last ten years. Although this
became somewhat of a controversial event , the Aviation Branch
is now a basic branch and appears to be thriving in spite of
much early resistance within the Army.
The AAC should not evolve into a basic branch. An
overwhelming majority support this belief (93%) . If an
officer began his career as a Second Lieutenant in the AAC, he
would have no operational experience. The user experience and
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grounding in the traditional Army mission that are so critical
to the military officers currently working in the acquisition
arena would be too limited.
The second viability question investigated the promotion
opportunities for AAC officers. Promotion floors have been
instituted for all AAC officers.
Question Two: Are promotion floors necessary for AAC
officers?
Thirteen (93%) thought promotion floors were necessary.
The general feeling was resistance exists to the AAC that
could manifest itself through low promotion rates for AAC
officers. The current Army policy is that promotion rates for
AAC officers as a group will be no lower that the Army
average. One officer said that every branch had promotion
floors thus this was not a significant change from Army
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policy. The one officer who believed AAC promotion floors was
a bad idea thought that it would force the system to promote
officers who should not be promoted.
The use of promotion floors for the AAC appears necessary.
If the AAC is to succeed, young officers will have to believe
that promotion opportunities in the AAC are not significantly
lower than those for officers in the operational track. As
the majority of the Army will continue the traditional career
development path, it is reasonable to assume that
representation on future Army promotion and school selection
boards will be officers who have followed the Army operational
track. However, selection boards considering AAC officers
should have a member or members, whose number is proportional
to the number of AAC officers being considered. The use of
promotion floors should reduce if not eliminate, apprehension
that AAC officers might have regarding a possible bias
against them by board members from the operational track. The
opportunity for promotion is just as important to an AAC
officer as it is for the operational officer, and as such
provides incentive for continued dedicated and professional
performance. Any perception of reduced chances of promotion
by virtue of becoming an AAC officer could be expected to harm
the appeal of the AAC.
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H. ISSUE FIVE: ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES
In concluding each interview, the PMs were asked to give
their assessment of the AAC in terms of strengths and
weaknesses. It should be noted that only aspects mentioned by
two or more interviewees are listed. The aspects of the AAC
that they considered strengths are listed below, along with
the number of interviewees that named each listing as a
strength. In their view, the strengths of the AAC are:
1. Mutually exclusive command and program management career
paths [seven officers (50%)
]
2. The fully funded ACS program [five officers (36%)]
3. Promotion selection board floors [three officers (21%)]
4. PEO/PM command structure [two officers (14%)]
5. Quality of AAC officers [two officers (14%)]
The following AAC weaknesses were identified by the PM's:
1. Lack of historical foundation within the Army [six
officers (43%)]
2. Insufficient number of PM office authorizations for
Captains and Majors [four officers (29%)]
3. Doubt about the viability of the AAC [four officers
(29%)]
4. Trend towards more civilian involvement [two officers
(14%)]
5. Lack of an established career path for civilians [two
officers (14%)]
The biggest strength of the AAC is that it is now the only
career path to becoming an Army program manager. The clear
separation of the path to program management and the path to
operational command at the eighth year of service is necessary
69
and even essential. The fact that assignment as a board
selected program manager is mutually exclusive with assignment
as a board selected commander indicates that the Army
considers both positions so important as to desire officer
dedication to one position or the other for a significant
amount of his career. Indeed, the most glaring weakness of
the MAM program was that an officer need not have been a part
of it as a prerequisite to becoming a program manager. Thus,
the MAM program had an inherent credibility problem. The AAC
as a program that is the only way to selection as a program
manager does not continue to suffer from its predecessor's
weakness. The AAC will produce better trained, educated, and
dedicated officers than in the past. The soldiers whose very
lives depend on their equipment deserve nothing less.
The biggest weakness of the AAC is simply a lack of
historical foundation. The AAC has only been in existence
since 1989. Therefore, because of its newness, doubt exists
as to the AAC's chances for survival. However, Federal
legislation such as the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act should ensure the AAC • s continued survival and
growth.
Insufficient program management office authorizations in
manning documents for Captains and Majors is a clear weakness.
This weakness should be corrected quickly by increasing the
number of such authorizations. This will allow more AAC
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officers to gain valuable experience that appears essential
prior to assignment as an Army program manager.
I. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the data gathered through the
personal interviews conducted with fourteen Army program
managers. The fficers were informative and candid in their
thoughts and feelings. They constitute a critical and
credible source of information on how well the AAC is likely
to address and solve the problems the Army has had in the past
with its programs and policies for selecting, educating, and
training its program managers.
This chapter also analyzed the AAC using the information
presented in previous chapters to indentify the strengths and
weaknesses of the AAC. The AAC model was in large part
validated as effectively addressing the problems that previous
Army programs had involving selection, education, and training
of Acquisiition Oriented officers. The few areas that require
further study and action, along with conclusions and
recommendations will be discussed in the next chapter.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The primary purpose of this thesis was to conduct an
analysis of the Army Acquisition Corps as it applies to Army
officers. The structure and the policies of the Army
Acquisition Corps were examined in detail. The goal was to
examine the career model and policies as they apply to Army
officers. Specific issues pertaining to Army Acquisition
Corps policies were identified and evaluated. Specific
conclusions were • then drawn and recommendations for
improvement were made as appropriate. Research was conducted
through review of literature dealing with military acquisition
workforce issues and by personal interviews conducted with
fourteen Army program managers. The follwoing conclusions are
based on the results of the PM interviews. A number of
recommendations based on these conclusions are provided.
B. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Based upon research, weaknesses with the Material
Acquisition Management program have been addressed effectively
by the structure and policies of the Army Acquisition Corps.
The Army Acquisition Corps career development model is sound.
The Army Acquisition Corps model is a major institutional
change and addresses many of the recommendations of the
Packard Commission. It employs new innovations in personnel
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management for those officers selected to become members. The
Army Acquisition Corps employs more restrictive selection
criteria, improves and standardizes both military and civilian
education of its members, and uses repetitive assignments in
acquisition related jobs to groom its members for critical
acquisition assignments. Most importantly, the Army
Acquisition Corps model is now the unique and exclusive path
to program manager positions, demonstrating the Army's belief
that separate career paths for operational officers and
acquisition officers are necessary.
The Army Acquisition Corps is a concept which is timely
and appropriate. The concept should be allowed to operate
without significant change. Any major restructuring before
the officers who are junior enough to complete the entire
career path serve as program managers is premature. As with
any new personnel program within an institution as old and
traditional as the Army, resistance from the "old guard" is to
be expected. The Army Acquisition Corps has been well planned
and initiated and directly corrects problems that have existed
in the career development of the Army's program managers.
C. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
1) The volunteer and "draftee" combination is the
best accession policy.
The Army Acquisition Corps should continue to use a
combination of a "draft", for officers with desirable skills,
and volunteers. Volunteers for the Army Acquisition Corps
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should be screened. Also, if an officer has special skills or
a background particularly suitable for the Army Acquisition
Corps he should be drafted. The needs of the Army must come
first. If a sufficient number of volunteer officers qualify,
the Army Acquisition Corps should not draft.
2) The single tracking concept upon accession into
the Army Acquisition Corps at the eighth year is
necessary.
The idea of single tracking was supported by all the
officers interviewed. Although, the majority favored single
tracking after a branch assignment as a Major, elements of the
minority position should also be considered. First and
foremost, only by single tracking at the eighth year will
officers of the Army Acquisition Corps have significantly more
experience in acquisition assignments than their predecessors,
who had to rotate between a branch assignment and an
acquisition assignment. Secondly, with very few exceptions,
there are no authorized positions for an officer at the rank
of Major in company level units. The lowest level unit that
includes authorization for a Major is the battalion. The
staff jobs for a Major in a battalion, although certainly user
related, are focused more on performing staff work than
direct user experience. Finally, with positions for Majors in
user units coveted by operational officers aspiring to
command, it is highly unlikely that an Army Acquisition Corps
officer would be assigned to these positions at the expense of
his operational colleague. Therefore, due to the studies that
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call for more acquisition experience prior to assignment as a
program manager, and the doubtfulness that an Army Acquisition
Corps officer would gain direct user experience, the concept
of single tracking at the eighth year appears more viable.
3) Specific assignments in key development positions should
be included in the career paths of Army Acquisition
Corps officers.
The position identified as best preparing an officer for
duties as a program manager was that of Assistant Program
Manager (APM) . The next best developmental position
identified by the PM's was operational or developmental
testing. Additionally, positions within the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition or the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations were identified as excellent developmental
experience, providing they are directly related to
acquisition. Finally, an assignment to a procurement command
working in a functional directorate supporting a program
management office is was recommended for good developmental
experience.
4) The Army Acquisition Corps should be available to
officers regardless of undergraduate degree or major,
and the use of the Advanced Civil School program should
be provided for all Army Acquisition Corps officers.
The only consideration of an Army Acquisition Corps
officer's undergraduate record need be the likelihood of
graduate school admission. The skills and mental discipline
to earn an advanced degree are fundamental to success as a
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program manager. The most useful graduate field of study
identified was management.
5) The military education provided by a branch basic
course, advanced course, and the Combined Arms and
Services Staff School is essential for all Army
Acquisition Corps officers. The military schools that
follow these require review to determine which are truly
essential for the Army Acquisition Corps officer.
The program managers interviewed unanimously supported use
of a basic and advanced course along with the Combined Arms
and Services Staff School. The Material Acquisition
Management (MAM) course effectively serves the Army
Acquisition Corps. However, the MAM course is necessary only
if the officer has had no previous assignment in acquisition.
The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) course is not
viewed as being as useful to the Army Acquisition Corps
officer as the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC)
Program Manager (PM) course. Presently, CGSC is the primary
route to Military Education Level four (MEL-4) , and was viewed
as a requirement for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The PM
course does not yield MEL-4 credit by policy, yet it is
required to assume duties as a program manager. The primary
route to MEL-1 for Army officers is completion of the Army War
College. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
course should best serve the needs of the Army Acquisition
Corps officer.
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6) The Army Acquisition Corps should not become a basic
branch.
The operational experience that an Army officer brings to
the Army Acquisition Corps is absolutely critical. The eight
years that Army officers serve before accession into the Army
Acquisition Corps should give them credibility with the
traditional operational officer. This credibility comes from
a common bond of military schooling and operational
assignments. The user identification is sometimes lacking
with civilian acquisitioon personnel.. A strong link must
exist between those using the equipment and those responsible
for its development, otherwise the user's needs may not be
represented.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the analysis of the Army Acquisition Corps
presented in Chapter IV, and the conclusions drawn, the
following are recommended:
1) Officers' records should be screened during accession to
ensure that each officer recommended for the Army
Acquisition Corps has a model series of assignments
within his branch. Additionally, only officers that
have an undergraduate record that will allow admission
to a graduate program should be nominated.
2) More authorizations for Assistant Program Managers
(APMs) should be created. The proponent office of the
Army Acquisition Corps, in conjunction with the office
of the Army Acquisition Executive, should revise
authorization documents to include as a minimum,
authorization for one APM at the rank of Major for each
Army program manager.
3) The Army Acquisition Corps. should continue to afford all
officers accessed the opportunity to attend fully funded
graduate schooling, primarily for management degrees.
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4) The basic and advanced course for each branch should
include a formal block of instruction on the Army
Acquisition Corps career model. Because each branch is
represented in the Army Acquisition Corps, it is
important that officers be aware of its existence.
Additionally, since only a few functional areas are
eligible for the Army Acquisition Corps and functional
area designation takes place between the fifth and sixth
year, the education must be early in the officer's
career.
5) The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) Program
Manager (PM) course should be made a Military Education
Level four (MEL-4) equivalent. The Department of the
Army, in conjunction with the Defense Systems Management
College, should authorize graduation from the DSMC PM
course to fulfill the MEL-4 requirement. Additionally,
the Defense Systems Management College should develop
the course in a correspondence format to allow for an
increase in the number of officers who can benefit.
6) Army Acquisition Corps officers should be directed to
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) , which
grants MEL-1 credit.
7) The Army Acquisition Corps must be allowed to stabilize
and mature without major changes. The officers of Year
Group 1983 are the first that will have experienced the
complete career development path. Thus, they will be
program managers in the year 2000. The Army Acquisition
Corps is fundamentally sound, but only if it is allowed
to survive will its improvements be realized.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas are related to this thesis and warrant
further research:
1) The Army Acquisition Corps is composed of both military
and civilian personnel. The career development path for
civilian personnel is much less clear than that for the
military. Research is necessary to build a civilian
career model leading to assignment as a program manager.
2) The sample size of officers used as the basis for this
thesis is relatively small. A similar research effort
using a different set of interviewees is warranted and
would be useful for comparison purposes
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3) The private sector has personnel who serve as program
managers. Research into industry program manager
selection, education, assignments, and training would
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